

Claim Amendments:

1. (currently amended) A method comprising the steps of:

encrypting a data message  $m$  using a primary transmitter secret key  $z$  to form a quantity

$E$ , wherein El Gamal encryption is used for encrypting the data message  $m$ ;

preparing a quadruplet  $(a_{\text{new}}, b_{\text{new}}, s_{\text{new}}, E)$  where:

$$a_{\text{new}} = z * y^c \text{ modulo } p;$$

$$b_{\text{new}} = g^c \text{ modulo } p;$$

$$s_{\text{new}} = \text{signature}_c(a_{\text{new}}, b_{\text{new}}, E);$$

where  $y = g^x \text{ modulo } p$ ,  $c$  is a random number which is used in the step of encrypting the data message  $m$  using El Gamal encryption,  $x$  is a receiver secret key, and the parameters  $g$ ,  $x$ , and  $p$  are picked using a known encryption method;

wherein  $s_{\text{new}}$  is a signature which is determined by using the same random number  $c$  that was used to determine  $a_{\text{new}}$  and  $b_{\text{new}}$ ;

verifying the signature  $s_{\text{new}}$ ;

decrypting  $a_{\text{new}}$  and  $b_{\text{new}}$  using the receiver secret key  $x$  to get the primary transmitter secret key  $z$ ;

using the primary transmitter secret key  $z$  to decrypt the quantity  $E$  and thereby obtaining the message  $m$ .

2. (original) The method of claim 1 and wherein:

the step of decrypting  $a_{\text{new}}$  and  $b_{\text{new}}$  using the receiver secret key  $x$  to get the primary transmitter secret key  $z$  is comprised of computing  $z = a_{\text{new}}/b_{\text{new}}^x$

3. (cancelled)

4. (cancelled)

5. (original) The method of claim 1 wherein:

the primary transmitter secret key  $z$  is determined from the formula of  $z = g^Y$  modulo  $p$ , where  $Y$  is a random value chosen from the set  $[0..q]$ , where  $q$  is a value picked using a known encryption method.

6. (currently amended) A method comprising the steps of:

creating a primary transmitter key  $z$ ;

creating a secondary transmitter key  $z'$  which is a function of  $z$ ;

encrypting a data message  $m$  using the secondary transmitter secret key  $z'$  to form a quantity  $E$ , wherein El Gamal encryption is used for encrypting the data message  $m$ ;

preparing a quadruplet  $(a_{\text{new}}, b_{\text{new}}, s_{\text{new}}, E)$  where:

$$a_{\text{new}} = z^* y^c \text{ modulo } p;$$

$$b_{\text{new}} = g^c \text{ modulo } p;$$

$$s_{\text{new}} = \text{signature}_c(a_{\text{new}}, b_{\text{new}}, E);$$

where  $y = g^x$  modulo  $p$ ,  $c$  is a random number which is used in the step of encrypting the data message  $m$  using El Gamal encryption,  $x$  is a receiver secret key, and the parameters  $g$ ,  $x$ , and  $p$  are picked using a known encryption method;

wherein  $s_{\text{new}}$  is a signature which is determined by using the same random number  $c$  that was used to determine  $a_{\text{new}}$  and  $b_{\text{new}}$ ;

verifying the signature  $s_{\text{new}}$ ;

decrypting  $a_{\text{new}}$  and  $b_{\text{new}}$  using the receiver secret key  $x$  to get the primary transmitter secret key  $z$ ;

modifying the primary transmitter secret key  $z$  to obtain the secondary transmitter secret key  $z'$  and using the secondary transmitter secret key  $z'$  to decrypt the quantity  $E$  and

thereby obtaining the message m.

7. (original) The method of claim 6 and wherein:

the primary transmitter key z is provided which is not of the format used for producing the ciphertext E,

the secondary transmitter key z' is computed as a function of z, where the function is an arbitrary function.

8. (currently amended) A method comprising the steps of:

creating a primary transmitter key z;

creating a secondary transmitter key z' which is a function of z;

providing a plurality of portion keys which are derived from the secondary transmitter key z';

encrypting a data message m using the plurality of portion keys to form a quantity E,

wherein El Gamal encryption is used for encrypting the data message m;

preparing a quadruplet (a<sub>new</sub>, b<sub>new</sub>, s<sub>new</sub>, E) where:

$$a_{\text{new}} = z^* y^c \text{ modulo } p;$$

$$b_{\text{new}} = g^c \text{ modulo } p;$$

$$s_{\text{new}} = \text{signature}_c(a_{\text{new}}, b_{\text{new}}, E);$$

where  $y = g^x \text{ modulo } p$ , c is a random number which is used in the step of encrypting the data message m using El Gamal encryption, x is a receiver secret key, and the parameters g, x, and p are picked using a known encryption method;

wherein s<sub>new</sub> is a signature which is determined by using the same random number c that was used to determine a<sub>new</sub> and b<sub>new</sub>;

verifying the signature s<sub>new</sub>;

decrypting a<sub>new</sub> and b<sub>new</sub> using the receiver secret key x to get the primary transmitter

secret key z;

modifying the primary transmitter secret key z to obtain the secondary transmitter secret key z' and using the secondary transmitter secret key z' to determine the plurality of portion keys and using the plurality of portion keys to decrypt the quantity E and thereby obtaining the message m.

9. (previously presented) The method of claim 1 wherein

the signature  $s_{new}$  is determined by using a Schnorr signature method.

10. (previously presented) The method of claim 1 wherein

the signature  $s_{new}$  is determined using a Digital Signature Standard.

11. (currently amended) An apparatus comprising

a processor;

wherein the processor

encrypts a data message m using a primary transmitter secret key z to form a quantity E, wherein El Gamal encryption is used to encrypt the data message m; and

prepares a quadruplet ( $a_{new}$ ,  $b_{new}$ ,  $s_{new}$ , E) where:

$$a_{new} = z^* y^c \text{ modulo } p;$$

$$b_{new} = g^c \text{ modulo } p;$$

$$s_{new} = \text{signature}_c(a_{new}, b_{new}, E);$$

where  $y = g^x \text{ modulo } p$ , c is a random number which is used in the step of encrypting the data message m using El Gamal encryption, x is a receiver secret key, and the parameters g, x, and p are picked using a known encryption method; and

wherein  $s_{new}$  is a signature, and wherein the processor determines  $s_{new}$  by

using the same random number  $c$  that was used to determine  $a_{\text{new}}$  and  $b_{\text{new}}$ .

12. (cancelled).

13. (previously presented) The apparatus of claim 11 wherein  
the processor uses a Schnorr signature method to determine  $s_{\text{new}}$ .

14. (previously presented) The apparatus of claim 11 wherein  
the processor uses a Digital Signature Standard to determine  $s_{\text{new}}$ .